

HOMONYMY IN ARISTOTLE AND SPEUSIPPUS

A. THE HAMBRUCH THESIS

1. 'THERE are important differences between Aristotle's account of homonymy and synonymy on the one hand, and Speusippus' on the other; in particular, Aristotle treated homonymy and synonymy as properties of things, whereas Speusippus treated them as properties of words. Despite this difference, in certain significant passages Aristotle fell under the influence of Speusippus and used the words "homonymous" and "synonymous" in their Speusippian senses.'

These sentences are a rough expression of what I shall call the Hambruch thesis. The thesis was advanced by Ernst Hambruch in 1904 in his remarkable monograph on the relation between Academic and early Aristotelian logic.¹ Hambruch singled out *Topics A* 15 as peculiarly Speusippian, and he conjectured that it was based on some written work of Speusippus. The Hambruch thesis was supported by Lang in his excellent edition of the surviving fragments of Speusippus;² and again by Stenzel in his Pauly-Wissowa article.³ It was accepted, and slightly embellished, by Cherniss;⁴ and it has recently been reaffirmed by Anton in one of a series of essays on homonymy in Aristotle.⁵ Apart from a sceptical footnote by Owen⁶ I have found no signs of dissent.

2. There are two preliminary matters to be cleared up. First, the Hambruch thesis turns on an antithesis between 'words' and 'things': can we give an acceptable formulation to this curious contrast? Let us look at Aristotle's familiar account of homonymy at the beginning of the *Categories*:

(A1) ὁμώνυμα λέγεται ὡν ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὃ δὲ κατὰ τοῦνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερος.

Bypassing the several stock problems raised by this sentence⁷ I offer the following definition as a more formal version of what Aristotle means:

¹ E. Hambruch, *Logische Regeln der platonischen Schule in der aristotelischen Topik*, Berlin, 1904, pp. 28-9.

² P. Lang, *De Speusippi Academici scriptis*, Bonn, 1911 (Hildesheim, 1965), pp. 25-6.

³ J. Stenzel, art. 'Speusippos', *RE* iiiA, 1929, 1654. 4-44.

⁴ H. Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy*, Baltimore, 1944, pp. 56-8; cf. *The Riddle of the Early Academy*, Berkeley, 1945, p. 40.

⁵ J. P. Anton, 'The Aristotelian Doctrine of *Homonymia* in the *Categories* and its Platonic Antecedents', *JHistPhil* vi (1968), 315-26, p. 323. Anton's other articles are: 'The meaning of ὁ λόγος τῆς οὐσίας in Aristotle's *Categories* 1a', *Monist* lii (1968), 252-67; 'Ancient Interpretations of Aristotle's Doctrine of *Homonymia*', *JHistPhil* vii (1969), 1-18.

⁶ G. E. L. Owen, 'A Proof in the *Περὶ Ἰδεῶν*', *JHS* lxxvii (1957), 103-11, reprinted in R. E. Allen (ed.), *Studies in Plato's Metaphysics*, London, 1965; see p. 104 n. 1 = p. 295 n. 1. P. Merlan, 'Beiträge zur Geschichte des antiken Platonismus: I, Zur Erklärung der dem Aristoteles zugeschriebenen Kategorienschrift', *Phlg* lxxxix (1934), 35-53, criticizes the Hambruch thesis on the grounds of triviality (pp. 47-53); see below, p. 70 n. 2.

⁷ See Porphyrius, *In Aristotelis Categorias Expositio per interrogationem et responsionem*, ed. A. Busse, Berlin, 1887 (*CIAG* iv. 1), 59. 34-67. 32. (This is Porphyry's minor commentary on the *Categories*; his larger work, inscribed to Gedaleius, is unfortunately lost: cf. Simplicius, *In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarius*, ed. C. Kalbfleisch, Berlin, 1907 (*CIAG* viii), 2. 5-9; R. Beutler, art.

- (D1) x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n are homonymous if and only if there is some term A such that (i) x_1 is A and x_2 is A and \dots and x_n is A; and (ii) the meaning of A is different in each of the sentences ' x_1 is A', ' x_2 is A', \dots , ' x_n is A'.

Aristotle explains synonymy by the sentence:

- (A2) συνώνυμα . . . λέγεται ὦν τό τε ὄνομα κοινὸν καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοῦνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ὁ αὐτός.

To produce (D2), which (A2) expresses, take (D1) and change 'homonymous' to 'synonymous' and 'different' to 'the same'.

According to the commentators,¹ Aristotelian homonymy and synonymy are properties of 'things' rather than of 'words'; is this true? What is true is this: if x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n are homonymous or synonymous, it does not follow that they are words, or, more generally, that they are linguistic items of some sort.² What the commentators say suggests that they also hold the view that if x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n are homonymous or synonymous, then it does follow that they are not words, and, more generally, that they are not linguistic items of any sort. But this view is plainly false.

Is it possible to give an alternative account of homonymy and synonymy which makes them properties of linguistic items exclusively? I imagine that the sort of thing the commentators have in mind is provided by the two following definitions:

- (D10) x is homonymous if and only if x has more than one meaning;

- (D20) x is synonymous if and only if x has just one meaning.

If x is synonymous or homonymous in the sense given by (D10) or (D20), then it *does* follow that x is a linguistic item of some sort; for only linguistic items can be said to have meaning, in the sense of 'meaning' required by these definitions.³

This difference between (D1) and (D10), and (D2) and (D20), is, I suspect, what the commentators' antithesis was intended to indicate. But their indication

'Porphyrios', *RE* xxii. 1, 1953, 283). Porphyry's is the earliest of the seven commentaries on the *Categories* published in *CIAG*; the other six, in chronological order, are those of: Dexippus (mid 4th century); Ammonius (end of 5th century); Ammonius' three pupils, Simplicius, Olympiodorus, and Philoponus; and Olympiodorus' pupil Elias. *CIAG* also prints a paraphrase which may be the work of the 13th-century monk Sophonias; there is an anonymous introduction to the *Categories* among Brandis's *Scholia in Aristotelem*, 30^a27–34^b20; and there is much unpublished material.

The later commentators are heavily dependent on their predecessors, especially Porphyry; this is well illustrated by their remarks on Aristotle's definition of homonymy (cf. K. Praechter, review of *CIAG*, *ByzZ* xviii (1909), 526–31; L. G. Westerink, *Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy*, Amsterdam, 1962, pp. xxvi–vii).

¹ See, e.g., Porphyry, 61. 14; 68. 12;

Ammonius, *In Aristotelis Categorias Commentaria*, ed. A. Busse, Berlin, 1895 (*CIAG* iv. 4), 18. 16; H. W. B. Joseph, *An Introduction to Logic*², Oxford, 1916, p. 47; K. J. J. Hintikka, 'Aristotle and the Ambiguity of Ambiguity', *Inquiry* ii (1959), p. 140; J. L. Ackrill, *Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione*, Oxford, 1962, p. 71. But note the opposite sentiment in Simplicius, 25. 7–9 (cf. 28. 1); and see below, p. 73. In practice the commentators occasionally speak of homonymous words: e.g. Ammonius, *In Porphyrii Isagogen Commentaria*, ed. A. Busse, Berlin, 1891 (*CIAG* iv. 3), 81. 23; 83. 21; 84. 21.

² This loose phrase is intended to cover phrases, sentences and the like, as well as words.

³ (D20) synonymy is quite different from what English grammarians generally mean by synonymy, namely sameness of meaning: 'equivocal' and 'univocal' are better words for the properties defined in (D10) and (D20).

is imprecise and misleading.¹ Instead of using it, I shall distinguish between *Aristotelian* homonymy and synonymy, where (as in the relations specified by (D₁) and (D₂)) being homonymous or synonymous does *not* entail being a linguistic item, and '*Speusippian*' homonymy and synonymy, where (as with the properties given by (D₁₀) and (D₂₀)) being homonymous or synonymous *does* entail being a linguistic item. The reason for the inverted commas around '*Speusippian*' will emerge in part B.

Translated into this jargon, the Hambruch thesis claims that *Speusippus' onymies* are '*Speusippian*', and that in certain passages Aristotle abandons his *Aristotelian onymies* and succumbs to the '*Speusippian*' notions.

3. The second point concerns the relative dating of Speusippus and Aristotle; for Hambruch must suppose that Speusippus thought about homonymy and synonymy before Aristotle wrote *Topics A*. The evidence for Speusippus' life has been sifted by Merlan:² his death can be placed in 339, and his birth about 410; but his writings, with a few uninteresting exceptions, cannot be dated. Aristotle's *Topics* is generally acknowledged to be an early work, though book *A* probably does not represent the earliest stratum.³ It is thus quite possible that Speusippus' work on the *onymies* postdates Aristotle's; Hambruch's supposition rests, as far as I can see, on the single fact that Speusippus was Aristotle's senior by some thirty years. No doubt it is reasonable to use the supposition in building theses; but it is a brick made with very little straw.

B. SPEUSIPPUS ON HOMONYMY

4. One of the types of fallacy discussed in the *Sophistici Elenchi* is argument *παρὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν*. Aristotle makes it clear that he was not the first to discuss this type of *ἔλεγχος*; he expressly takes issue with some men who claimed that *all ἔλεγχοι* were due to equivocation (20, 177^b7-9). Poste identified these men with the people who are said in chapter 10 to divide *ἔλεγχοι* into those *πρὸς τοῦνομα* and those *πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν*.⁴ Cherniss then gave Poste's people the name of Speusippus (p. 57 n. 47; cf. Anton, 'The Aristotelian Doctrine . . .', p. 320).

Poste's identification is no more than a guess.⁵ Is Cherniss right in finding Speusippus among the classifiers of chapter 20? His argument for the identification is remarkably feeble;⁶ it would be better to refer to 15, 174^b23-7 (= F3a Lang) which at least proves Speusippus' familiarity with fallacies of equivocation.⁷ But F3a does not, of course, suffice to establish, or even make probable,

¹ And it fails to remark on another significant distinction between the pairs of definitions: that (D₁) and (D₂) define *polyadic* predicates or relations, whereas the *definienda* of (D₁₀) and (D₂₀) are *monadic*.

² P. Merlan, 'Zur Biographie des Speusippus', *Phlg* ciii (1959), 198-214.

³ See now J. Brunschwig, *Aristote: Topiques i-iv*, Paris (Budé), 1967, pp. lxxii-lxxvi; lxxiii-civ.

⁴ E. Poste, *Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi*, London, 1866, p. 151. He offers no reason for the identification.

⁵ The classifications are no doubt compatible; but they are logically independent. There is more reason to connect the men

of chapter 20 with the persons criticized at 24, 179^b38-180^a7, and 33, 182^b22-7; we do not know who these persons are.

⁶ He refers to 'the importance which Speusippus attached to the division of words and the relation of word to concept as the basis of this division'. But there is no evidence that Speusippus attached any importance of the required sort to this division; and if there were, that would be curious ground for ascribing to him the view that all fallacies are due to equivocation.

⁷ The passage was discussed and the attribution to Speusippus suggested by I. Bywater, 'The Cleophras in Aristotle', *JPh* xii (1883), 17-30.

Cherniss's identification. Speusippus' interest in equivocation was by no means unique¹ and he has no special claim to be the object of Aristotle's criticism in chapter 20. The question calls for a healthy agnosticism.

5. Much more interesting than this uncertain intimation are the three excerpts from Simplicius' commentary on the *Categories* which Lang groups together as fragment 32 of Speusippus. The longest of these (Simplicius 38. 19–39. 2 = F32a Lang) reads as follows:

Σπεύσιππον τοίνυν ἱστορεῖ Βόηθος τοιαύτην διαίρεσιν παραλαμβάνειν τὰ
ὀνόματα πάντα περιλαμβάνουσιν. τῶν γὰρ ὀνομάτων, φησί, τὰ μὲν ταυτώνυμα
ἐστίν, τὰ δὲ ἑτερόνυμα· καὶ τῶν ταυτώνυμων τὰ μὲν ὁμώνυμα ἐστίν, τὰ δὲ
5 συνώνυμα, κατὰ τὴν τῶν παλαιῶν συνήθειαν ἀκούοντων ἡμῶν τὰ συνώνυμα·
τῶν δὲ ἑτερόνυμων τὰ μὲν εἶναι ἰδίως ἑτερόνυμα, τὰ δὲ πολυνώνυμα, τὰ δὲ
παρώνυμα. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ἀποδέδοται, πολυνώνυμα δὲ ἐστίν τὰ
διάφορα καὶ πολλὰ ὀνόματα καθ' ἑνὸς πράγματος, ὅταν εἰς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς αὐτῶν
ἢ λόγος, ὥσπερ ἄορ ξίφος μάχαιρα φάσαντο· ἑτερόνυμα δὲ ἐστίν τὰ καὶ τοῖς
10 ὀνόμασιν καὶ τοῖς πράγμασιν καὶ τοῖς λόγοις ἕτερα, οἷον γραμματικὴ ἄνθρωπος
ξύλον.²

Boethus, whom Simplicius is quoting, was a contemporary of Strabo who succeeded Andronicus of Rhodes as head of the Lyceum;³ he wrote, among other scholarly works, a commentary on the *Categories* (see, e.g., Porphyry, 59. 17), and it is doubtless from this that Simplicius quotes. Simplicius had a high opinion of Boethus (1. 17; 159. 14); and he often refers to him.⁴

How much of this paragraph is Speusippus? The answer turns on the identification of the referents of three expressions:⁵

(i) To whom does 'we' in line 4 refer? Two pages earlier Simplicius quotes

¹ Cf. W. B. Stanford, *Ambiguity in Greek Literature*, Oxford, 1939, pp. 2–5.

² Peter Lambeck found lines 2 (τῶν γὰρ ...) to 5 (... ἑτερόνυμων) under the heading 'Ἡ Σπευσίππου Διαίρεσις in one of the MSS. he catalogued (Petrus Lambecius, *Commentaria de augustissima Bibliotheca Caesarea Vindobonensi*, vii, Vienna, 1675, p. 135—Lang's '185' is a misprint). See L. G. Westerink and B. Laourdas, 'Scholia by Arethas in Vindob. Phil. Gr. 314', *Hel-lenika* xvii (1962), 105–31: 'Ἡ Σπευσίππου Διαίρεσις heads a miscellaneous appendix to the MS. (published on pp. 127–31), only the first entry of which has anything to do with Speusippus. This reads: τῶν ὀνομάτων τὰ μὲν ταυτώνυμα τὰ δὲ ἑτερόνυμα· τῶν δὲ ταυτώνυμων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν ὁμώνυμα τὰ δὲ συνώνυμα· τῶν δὲ ἑτερόνυμων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ παρώνυμα τὰ δὲ πολυνώνυμα. This is doubtless a careless excerpt from Simplicius. The MS. dates from 924 or 925 and was copied from a codex belonging to Arethas; Arethas is known to have read and excerpted from Simplicius' commentary on the *Categories* (see Kalbfleisch in Simplicius, p. xiv). See also J. H. C. Schubart, 'Einige Bemer-

kungen über das griechische Scholienwesen', *ZfdAltwiss* i (1834), 1137–44.

³ T. Waitz, *Aristotelis Organon*, Leipzig, 1844–6, i. 45. This Boethus, number 9 in Pauly–Wissowa, should be distinguished from his homonym and compatriot, the peripatetically inclined Stoic.

⁴ Lang, p. 66, says that Simplicius quotes Boethus at second hand, from Porphyry's lost *editio maior*. He certainly does this in the case of F32c of Speusippus (cf. 11. 23; 29. 30; 78. 20; i. 45. p. 69 n. 1 below); and he expresses a general debt to Porphyry whom he claims to follow closely (2. 5–9; cf. 559^b). But Simplicius was a learned man (cf. 1. 1–3. 17), and he admired Boethus; we need not assume that he was not directly acquainted with Boethus' commentary.

Simplicius did not have first-hand knowledge of Speusippus' works; the *ὡς φασιν* in F32b shows that.

⁵ Of course the very first sentence is not Speusippian, though Lang prints it large and bold. I do not know what παραλαμβάνειν means in line 1; perhaps it is corrupt: something like παραστήσαι would be better.

verbatim a passage from Porphyry's lost commentary which contains the sentence: καὶ οὐ καλῶς ὁ Βόηθος παραλείφθαι τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει φησὶ τὰ παρὰ τοῖς νεωτέροις καλούμενα συνώνυμα (36. 38). Here it is Boethus who refers to the use of συνώνυμα by 'the moderns'; it is a reasonable conjecture that the person who refers in our passage to the use of συνώνυμα by 'the ancients' is again Boethus. I conclude that Boethus and his contemporaries (and not either Speusippus or Simplicius) are referred to by 'we'. (See further, p. 70 below.)

(ii) Who is subject of φησὶ in line 2? 'Speusippus' and 'Boethus' are the possible answers. I think that 'Boethus' is right; for if we answer 'Speusippus' then, given that 'we' in line 4 refers to Boethus, Simplicius is landed with an intolerably tortuous sentence.

(iii) 'The others have been set down' (line 6)—by whom? Simplicius certainly has already described homonymy, synonymy, and paronymy; but then he has also already described polyonymy and heteronymy (22. 14–23. 3). It is hard to think of any context, in his *Διαιρέσεις* or elsewhere, in which Speusippus would first explain homonymy, synonymy, and paronymy; then give his 'division'; and finally explain polyonymy and heteronymy. But this order of exposition is readily intelligible in a commentary on the first chapter of the *Categories* (though the extant commentators do not adopt it);¹ and I infer that the answer to question (iii) is again 'Boethus'. This being so, there is, I think, no reason in the text to ascribe the definitions in lines 6–10 to Speusippus; the text does not exclude Speusippian authorship, but it is quite compatible with the view that the definitions are due to Boethus. If we wish for evidence on Speusippus' definitions, we must turn to fragments 32b and 32c.

6. F32b reads: Σπεύσιππος δέ, ὥς φασιν, ἡρκεῖτο λέγειν ὁ δὲ λόγος ἕτερος (Simplicius, 29. 5).² It is important to observe the context in which this fragment occurs. Simplicius is engaged with the question, standard from Porphyry (62. 34–64. 22) onwards: Why did Aristotle include the phrase κατὰ τοῦνομα in his definition of homonymy? This is quite separate from the equally standard question (Porphyry, 64. 23–65. 11—taken up by all the commentators, including Simplicius, 29. 13–29): Why did Aristotle include the phrase τῆς οὐσίας in his definition? This latter question arose as a result of an objection by Nicostratus³ (cf. Simplicius, 29. 25); Speusippus is nowhere mentioned in connection with it.

It is clear from this that F32b warrants the assertion that Speusippus omitted κατὰ τοῦνομα from his definition of homonymy. He may also have omitted τῆς οὐσίας: but F32b, which does not touch upon the questions raised by this phrase, provides no evidence that he did; and the silence of Simplicius and

¹ But see Porphyry, 68. 28–69. 13: I guess that this is a reflection of Boethus' commentary (note that F32a occupies a place in Simplicius' commentary analogous to this section in Porphyry; perhaps this supports Lang's conjecture—above, p. 68 n. 4—that Simplicius got F32a from Porphyry's major commentary). It may be that Porphyry's debt to Boethus was no smaller than his successors' debt to him.

² Similar contentment (ἡρκεῖ) is men-

tioned, without definite ascription, by Porphyry, 63. 1–2; 64. 25; and Dexippus, *In Aristotelis Categorias Commentaria*, ed. A. Busse, Berlin, 1888 (*CIAG* iv. 2), 20. 21–3. It is likely that Simplicius is relying on Porphyry's major commentary.

³ Platonist, teacher of Marcus Aurelius, and author of a minute and critical examination of the *Categories*: see K. Praechter, 'Nikostratos der Platoniker', *Hermes* lvii (1922), 481–517.

all the other commentators when they do discuss τῆς οὐσίας is some evidence that he did not.¹

Can we reconstitute Speusippus' definition of homonymy from F32b? Simplicius reports one respect in which that definition differs from Aristotle's; he does not claim that this is the *only* difference, but his report does imply that Speusippus' definition was *in most respects* similar to Aristotle's, for otherwise it would be quite fatuous to remark that Speusippus omitted κατὰ τοῦνομα. Neither Simplicius nor anyone else mentions any other respect in which Speusippus' and Aristotle's definitions differed. I conclude that Speusippus defined homonymy in a sentence at most trivially different from:

(S1) ὁμώνυμα λέγεται ὦν ὄνομα μόνον κοινὸν ὃ δὲ λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερος.²

7. The third fragment is embedded in a passage from Porphyry's major commentary on the *Categories* which Simplicius preserves (36. 25–31 = F32c); it goes:

Ἐνθα δὲ περὶ τὰς πλείους φωνὰς ἢ σπουδῇ καὶ τὴν πολυειδῇ ἐκάστου ὀνομασίαν, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ Περὶ ποιητικῆς καὶ τῷ τρίτῳ Περὶ ῥητορικῆς, τοῦ ἑτέρου συνωνύμου δεόμεθα, ὅπερ πολυώνυμον ὁ Σπεύσιππος ἐκάλει. καὶ οὐ καλῶς ὁ Βόηθος παραλελείφθαι τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει φησὶ τὰ παρὰ τοῖς νεωτέροις καλούμενα συνώνυμα, ἅπερ Σπεύσιππος ἐκάλει πολυώνυμα. οὐ γὰρ παραλέλειπται, ἀλλ' ἐν ἄλλαις πραγματείαις, ἐν αἷς ἦν οἰκείος ὁ λόγος, παρελείπεται.

Speusippus used πολυώνυμα in the same way as 'the moderns' used συνώνυμα. Who were Boethus' 'moderns', and how did they define συνώνυμα?

Again, the context of the fragment is vital. Simplicius is discussing the rival merits of the Aristotelian and the Stoic uses of συνώνυμος (36. 8–31); he draws heavily on Porphyry's discussion,³ identifying Porphyry's second sort of synonymy, and hence the synonymy of Boethus' 'moderns', with Stoic synonymy.⁴ Stoic synonymy is explained by Simplicius as follows: συνώνυμα κεκλήκε[ασι] . . . οἱ Στωϊκοὶ τὰ πολλὰ ἅμα ἔχοντα ὀνόματα, ὡς Πάρις καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ αὐτός⁵ καὶ ἀπλῶς τὰ πολυώνυμα λεγόμενα (36. 8–11). The example of Paris at first suggests a fairly restricted notion: Stoic synonyms are objects having more than one proper name. But Simplicius' addition, 'and in general the things called polyonyms', corrects this impression; for he himself gives as

¹ This tells against the conjecture (noted in Waitz, i. 270; supported by Anton, 'The Meaning . . .', pp. 258–9) that Speusippus' influence accounts for the omission of τῆς οὐσίας in some texts of the *Categories* at 1^a2 and 1^a7.

² Merlan, 'Beiträge . . .', p. 50, offers the same reconstruction; but he wrongly supposes that it is only trivially different from a 'Speusippian' account of homonymy.

³ Though the question was discussed by Porphyry it was apparently raised again only by Simplicius and Olympiodorus (*In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium*, ed. A. Busse, Berlin, 1902 (CIAG xii. 1), 38. 6–12).

⁴ The contrast between οἱ νεώτεροι and οἱ ἀρχαῖοι is common in Alexander's logical works (cf. *In Aristotelis Analyticorum Priorum*

librum I Commentarius, ed. M. Wallies, Berlin, 1883 (CIAG ii. 1), 422^a and 423^a); it is clear that 'the moderns' are always the Stoics, whereas 'the ancients' are regularly (if not always) the older Peripatetics.

⁵ Perhaps a standard Stoic example: cf. Sextus Empiricus, *Pyrr. Hyp.* ii. 227.—Who are 'the Stoics' here? Von Arnim gives the sentence to Chrysippus (F150 = *SVF* ii. 45. 19), who is known to have written at length about ambiguity (see F152, F153—and especially Galen, *Περὶ τῶν παρὰ τὴν λέξιν σοφισμάτων* (Kühn xiv, pp. 582–98)—and cf. the book-titles at *SVF* ii. 6. 23–30). But it is possible that Simplicius' sentence stems ultimately from one of the many Stoic critics of the *Categories* (on whom see Praechter's article above, p. 69 n. 3).

examples of polyonyms: ἄνθρωπος μέροψ βροτὸς καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον (22. 26).¹ Thus the 'many names' (a) need not be proper names, but (b) must have the same meaning.

If Speusippus gave a definition of polyonymy, F32c makes it probable that his definition was expressed in a sentence at most trivially different from:

(S3) πολυώνυμα λέγεται ὧν πολλὰ ὀνόματα ὁ δὲ λόγος ὁ αὐτός.

Porphry says that πολυώνυμα ἐστὶν ὧν διάφορα μὲν καὶ πλεῖστα ὀνόματα ὁ δὲ λόγος εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτός (69. 1–2); this differs from his definition of polyonymy in terms of the four possible sorts of κοινωνία (60. 22–34: see below, p. 74 n. 3), and it is possible that it is extracted or adapted from Speusippus' writings.²

8. There is no evidence about Speusippus' accounts of synonymy and heteronymy (τὰ ἰδίως ἑτερόνυμα), the remaining elements in the main tetrachotomy of F32a. It is useful, however, to have Speusippian sentences in these cases too; and I think it is reasonable to construct by comparison with (S1) and (S3):

(S2) συνώνυμα λέγεται ὧν ὄνομα κοινὸν καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτός;

and

(S4) ἑτερόνυμα λέγεται ὧν πολλὰ ὀνόματα ὁ δὲ λόγος ἕτερος.³

These reconstructions assume that Speusippus gave a definition for each of the four *onymies*, and that these definitions were homogeneous. There is no textual evidence for this assumption; but in the absence of counter-evidence both assumptions are justifiable.

9. How are (S1) and (S2) related to Aristotle's account of homonymy and synonymy in the *Categories*?

First, it is quite plain that if x and y are homonyms or synonyms in the sense given to ὁμώνυμος and συνώνυμος in (S1) and (S2), it does *not* follow that x and y are words, or, in general, that they are linguistic items. And the same goes for (S3) and (S4). Thus Speusippus' homonymy is not 'Speusippian' and Speusippus' synonymy is not 'Speusippian'; and in general Speusippian *onymies* are not 'Speusippian'. In the language of the commentators, Speusippus' *onymies* are properties of things, not of words.

This conclusion tallies with the expectation raised by Speusippus' terminology. If his *onymies* were 'Speusippian', then ταυτώνυμος in 32a would mean 'being the same name as', and, in general, φ-ώνυμος would mean (roughly) 'being a φ name'. This interpretation would be strange; compounds in -ώνυμος are frequent in Greek,⁴ and in all cases φ-ώνυμος means (roughly) 'having

¹ The standard examples, an iambic line, are ἄορ ξίφος μάχαιρα φάσγανον σπάθη (cf. Porphyry, 69. 1–2—ultimately from Boethus, if my attribution to him of the definitions in F32a is correct).

² Cf. Alexander, *In Aristotelis Metaphysica Commentaria*, ed. M. Hayduck, Berlin, 1891 (CIAG I), 247. 27–9: . . . ὡς εἶναι τῶν πολυωνύμων τὸ ὑποκείμενον αὐτοῖς, ὧν πλείω μὲν ὀνόματα καθ' ἕκαστον δὲ τῶν ὀνομάτων ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, ὡς φασγάνου καὶ μαχαίρας, καὶ λωπίου καὶ ἱματίου. Cf. 281. 24.

³ See Porphyry, 69. 12: ἑτερόνυμα δὲ ἐστὶν ὧν τὸ τε ὄνομα καὶ ὁ λόγος ἕτερος.

⁴ Buck and Petersen list 91 -ώνυμος compounds in their reverse index; 22 are found before Speusippus' time. Liddell and Scott give F32a as the first appearance of ἑτερόνυμος (which they translate 'having a different signification') and as the sole appearance of ταυτώνυμος (which they better translate 'of the same name'). The proper 'Speusippian' words would be the late ἑτεροσήμαντος and ταυτοσήμαντος (or ταυτόσημος—cf. πολύσημος already in Democritus B26).

a ϕ name' and not 'being a ϕ name'. From a linguistic point of view, Speusippus' 'division' is naturally taken in an Aristotelian and not in a 'Speusippian' manner.

Consequently, in one item at least the Hambruch thesis is false: if Speusippus' and Aristotle's *onymies* do differ, it is not because the former are and the latter are not 'Speusippian'.

Moreover, although (S1) and (S2) do indeed differ from (A1) and (A2), nevertheless (S1) and (S2) express exactly the same thing as (A1) and (A2), namely (D1) and (D2). For the only difference between the two pairs of sentences is the presence of *κατὰ τοῦνομα* in (A1) and (A2). This phrase does no more than make explicit a proviso which we must assume to be implicit in (S1) and (S2).¹

Thus the evidence so far considered yields the conclusion that, contrary to the Hambruch thesis, there are no differences at all between Aristotle's and Speusippus' accounts of homonymy and synonymy. This conclusion receives some support from the facts (a) that Aristotle gives no hint of any dispute over the definition of homonymy and synonymy; and (b) that the Greek commentators, whose ears were attuned to 'word'/'thing' disputes in connection with the *Categories* (see below, p. 73 n. 1), know of no differences between Speusippus and Aristotle save the trivial one noticed in F32b.

10. Is there evidence against this conclusion and in favour of the Hambruch thesis? There is. I shall now consider three arguments which support the Hambruch thesis against the conclusion of the last section.

First, according to Simplicius (38. 19–20), Boethus referred to Speusippus' account of the *onymies* as a *διαίρεσις* . . . *τὰ ὀνόματα πάντα περιλαμβάνουσα*. And he continues: *τῶν γὰρ ὀνομάτων, φησί* . . . Boethus thus ascribes 'Speusippian' *onymies* to Speusippus. On my account, it will be argued, Speusippus' 'division' ought rather to begin: *τῶν γὰρ ὄντων* . . .² And it is scarcely decent to suppose that Boethus took such a text, asserted it to set up a division of *τὰ ὀνόματα πάντα*, and then changed *ὄντων* into *ὀνομάτων* to support his assertion.

Against this argument I think, first, that we should recall the prolonged controversy among the early commentators about the *πρόθεσις* or *σκοπός* of

¹ Why does Aristotle include *κατὰ τοῦνομα* in (A1) and (A2)? (Cf. Porphyry, 62. 34–64. 22: confused, but influential.) Both Plato and Socrates have a name in common, viz. 'man'; and they have different definitions, inasmuch as what it is for Plato to be flat-footed (e.g.) is different from what it is for Socrates to be snub-nosed (e.g.). An unkind reading of (S1) would allow these facts to qualify Plato and Socrates as homonyms. But obviously such facts are not sufficient to produce anything we should want to call homonymy, and (A1) makes this explicit. The qualification in (A1) and (A2) is implicit in (S1) and (S2) in that anyone who uttered (S1) and received the objection I have just sketched would reasonably retort that this was an ineffective objection, since

what he meant was (A1). At *Categories* 5, 3^b7, Aristotle expresses (D2) by the sentence:

(A2') *συνώνυμα δέ γε ἦν ὧν καὶ τοῦνομα κοινὸν καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτός*.

This has one qualification less than (S2); but Aristotle means by it what he meant by (A2).

² As in the paraphrase of the *Categories* (*In Aristotelis Categorias Paraphrasis*, ed. M. Hayduck, Berlin, 1883, (CIAG xxiii. 2), 1. 2–5); see also the opening of the 'alternative' *Categories* (Ross, *Aristotelis Fragmenta Selecta*, pp. 103–5—Ross's first testimonium is more readily found at Philoponus, *In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium*, ed. A. Busse, Berlin, 1898 (CIAG xiii. 1), 7. 25–31).

the *Categories*.¹ An answer to the question: What is Aristotle classifying in the *Categories*? may well influence, or even determine, an answer to the different question: What is it that is homonymous or synonymous?² Boethus held that the *Categories* classified words, and not things or thoughts (Porphyry, 59. 17–34; Simplicius, 11. 23–9); this may have led him to interpret the *onymies* as linguistic properties. And it seems that he did interpret them in this way. Simplicius preserves a lengthy fragment (25. 18–26. 2) in which Boethus answers the question why Aristotle specifies *ὀνόματα* at *Categories* 1, 1^a1, *καίτοι τῆς ὁμωνυμίας καὶ ἐν ῥήμασιν οὐσης* (25. 11). In his reply³ Boethus refers to searching *ἐφ’ ὅποιασούν λέξεως εἰ ὁμώνυμός ἐστιν*; and as examples he cites the sentences *τὸ κύων ὁμώνυμόν ἐστιν* and *τὸ ἡνδραπόδισται ὁμώνυμόν ἐστιν* (25. 20; 22–3). If in general Boethus construed the *onymies* as linguistic properties, then it is not at all surprising that he read Speusippus’ ‘division’ as a classification of words; and we cannot safely infer from Boethus’ interpretation to Speusippus’ intention.

In any case, secondly, Speusippus probably did not present his ‘division’ in the explicit form *τῶν X, τὰ μὲν . . . , τὰ δέ . . .*; Boethus may be reporting something more like an expanded version of chapter 1 of the *Categories* than one of the formal *διαίρεσεις* we know from elsewhere.⁴ If this is so, then the choice of an introductory genitive—*τῶν ὄντων* or *τῶν ὀνομάτων*—will have been made by Boethus with no direct help from Speusippus. This suggestion is more plausible if, as I have argued, the subject of *φησί* in line 2 of F32a is Boethus rather than Speusippus.

11. Secondly, the account of polyonymy in F32a is overtly such that any polyonym is a word: ‘Polyonyms are the many different names said of one thing, when there is one and the same definition of them.’

The account of heteronymy is less clear: ‘Heteronyms are what is different both in names and in things and in definitions.’⁵ The reference to both names and things is a little puzzling: I suppose the definition means to stipulate that *x* and *y* are heteronymous if and only if (a) *x* is *A* and *y* is *A*’, where *A* and *A*’ are not identical; (b) *x* is not identical with *y*; and (c) the meaning of *A* in

¹ There is a good history of the controversy in Simplicius, 9. 4–13. 26; the later commentators include briefer and inaccurate accounts. Andronicus may have opened the discussion (Simplicius, 379. 9); the various arguments were schematized in a pamphlet by Alexander’s teacher Sosigenes (see Dexippus, 6. 27–10. 32); Iamblichus produced a solution which purported to reconcile all the opposing views (cf. Olympiodorus, 19. 36–20. 12), and this became the orthodoxy of the later commentators.

² Compare the difficulties Porphyry finds at 61. 13–27, and the odd statement by Simplicius at 25. 7–9.

³ The question became a stock one, and the substance of Boethus’ answer was taken over by all the commentators (e.g. Porphyry, 62. 1; Ammonius, 18. 21); however, they all ignore the ‘Speusippian’ implications of what Boethus said. Boethus’ answer is fundamentally mistaken.

⁴ See H. Mutschmann, *Divisiones Aristoteleae*, Leipzig (Teubner), 1907. These ‘divisions’ are highly stereotyped in form; Mutschmann supposes that they were collected for school use (they are ‘ad discipulorum quamvis brutorum intelligentiam accommodatae’, p. iii). They should not be taken as accurate reproductions of the ‘divisions’ produced by the Academy.

⁵ Compare the definition of *ἕτερος* where it is opposed to *ἐτερόνυμος*: Ammonius, 16. 24–17. 3; Simplicius, 22. 31–3. This distinction lies behind the remarks of Alexander, *In Metaphysica* . . . , 247. 9–24 (cf. 366. 31; 377. 25–7: note the examples, which probably go back to *Physics* Γ 3, 202^b14 and *De Generatione Animalium* A 18, 724^b19–21); conceivably it grew out of reflection upon the account of heteronymy in F32a.

'x is A' differs from the meaning of A' in 'y is A'. Clause (b) makes heteronymy an irreflexive relation—one which a thing cannot bear to itself. (D1) and (D2), by contrast, do not require irreflexivity—indeed by (D2) everything is trivially synonymous with itself—but I guess that this is not by deliberate design. (The case of polyonymy is different: see below.) However that may be, the definition of heteronymy in F32a specifies an Aristotelian and not a 'Speusippian' relation.

Even if the definitions in F32a were unambiguously 'Speusippian', that would only tell for the Hambruch thesis on the assumption that the definitions were due to Speusippus. I have already argued that the text of F32a neither requires nor excludes this assumption; and it should be plain that the evidence provided by F32b and F32c makes the assumption highly improbable.

12. The third argument for the view that Speusippus' *onymies* are 'Speusippian' is this: the Aristotelian *onymies* do not constitute an exhaustive and exclusive *διαίρεσις*; but the 'Speusippian' *onymies* do; and Speusippus is said to have left a *διαίρεσις*.¹

Aristotelian *onymies* are not mutually exclusive. The Greek commentators, parrying a shaft from Nicostratus (Simplicius, 30. 16), regularly note that two things can be both homonymous and synonymous (e.g. Dexippus, 21. 5–7; Simplicius, 30. 16–31. 21);² and a little ingenuity will provide objects which are at the same time homonyms, synonyms, polyonyms, and heteronyms. This is possible because things in general have more than one predicate true of them—more than one 'name'. If it were supposed that each thing had only one name, then Aristotle's *onymies* would be exclusive. It is hard to avoid the impression that the commentators at times come near to adopting this supposition;³ but it is an absurd supposition.

Further, Aristotelian homonymy and synonymy are relations (see above, p. 67 n. 1), and so too is heteronymy; but polyonymy, on an Aristotelian reading, is most naturally taken as a *monadic* predicate.⁴ This fact constitutes a second inconcinnity in the Aristotelian 'division'.

Do the 'Speusippian' *onymies* fare better?

(i) 'Speusippian' homonymy and synonymy are easily taken as monadic predicates (cf. (D10) and (D20)); but, as the definition in F32a suggests, 'Speusippian' polyonymy is most readily construed as a *relation* between words—the relation of having the same meaning as. Similarly, 'Speusippian' heteronymy is relational. So in this respect the 'Speusippian' *διαίρεσις* is as badly off as the Aristotelian. (Homonymy and synonymy might, it is true, be taken as relations between different *occurrences* or tokens of a single word type, rather than as properties of a word type; but this is very forced.)

¹ Of course Aristotle does not himself offer the full-blown Aristotelian 'division'; the commentators, answering Boethus' complaint (Simplicius, 36. 28–30 = F32c), offered explanations and excuses (see Porphyry, 60. 34–61. 4—followed with embellishments by all later writers).

² The contradictory seems to be asserted by Dexippus at 20. 24–7 and by Simplicius at 29. 5–12 (cf. Olympiodorus, 31. 19–26); but their point is presumably the one made

more clearly by Ammonius 19. 18.

³ See, e.g., the standard way of introducing the four *onymies* as the four possible *σχέσεις ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι τῶν . . . λόγων πρὸς τὰ ὀνόματα* (Porphyry, 60. 22–34—note the definite articles; cf. Ammonius, 15. 16–16. 6).—In his definition of synonymy Aristotle talks of *the* name (τὸ ὄνομα: 1st6; cf. 3rd7); I do not know if there is any significance in this.

⁴ As the word *πολυώνυμος* suggests: *πολύς* is not a relational adjective.

(ii) If x and y are, say, 'Speusippian' polyonyms, that does not exclude their being synonyms or homonyms, or their each being heteronyms with some other words. In this way the 'Speusippian' διαίρεσις is not exclusive any more than the Aristotelian.

(iii) The 'division' is spoilt by the presence in it of paronyms, which I have so far deliberately ignored. As some of the ancient commentators appear to have realized (e.g. Ammonius, 23. 25–24. 12; Olympiodorus, 39. 23–40. 13; cf. Ackrill, p. 72), paronymy has no place with the other *onymies*. Thus the presence of paronymy in F32a ensures that *no* account can present Speusippus with a satisfactory 'division'.

13. The arguments for the Hambruch thesis discussed in the preceding three sections are not strong; and I am prepared to reassert the conclusion of section 9, that Aristotle's and Speusippus' *onymies* were in substance identical. It is, of course, possible that Speusippus' account was inconsistent, and that both Hambruch's view and the conclusion of section 9 are correct to a degree; this, in effect, is the view of Merlan ('Beiträge . . .'). But there is no direct evidence of such inconsistency; and I see no good reason for fathering it on Speusippus.

C. ARISTOTLE'S USE OF ὁμώνυμος

14. The first part of the Hambruch thesis, that Speusippus' notion of homonymy and synonymy was importantly different from Aristotle's, has proved false. But it is still worth looking at the second part, the claim that in certain places Aristotle makes use of 'Speusippian' notions. I shall first make some general remarks about Aristotle's use of the word ὁμώνυμος; and then consider briefly a few passages which have been mentioned in connection with the Hambruch thesis.

15. I distinguish five uses of ὁμώνυμος;¹ the last four can be explained in terms of the first, 'official', use.

(i) Aristotle sometimes says (i:a) 'A (or: the A) is homonymous with (the) B', or (i:b) '(the) A and (the) B are homonymous'. I call this the 'official' use because it can be explicated immediately by reference to (D1). At least it can when *singular* terms are substituted for A and B in these schemata. But Aristotle fails to distinguish this case from cases in which *general* terms are substituted for A and B; and he does not make it clear how (D1) should be modified to deal with these cases. I guess that he needs something like:

(D11) B_1, B_2, \dots, B_n are homonymous if and only if there is a term A such that (i) some B_1 is A, some B_2 is A, . . . , some B_n is A; and (ii) the sense of A is different in each of 'some B_1 is A', 'some B_2 is A', . . . , 'some B_n is A'.

For examples of use (i) see *Categories* 1, 1^a2–6; *Physics* H 4, 248^b7–9.

The disadvantage of use (i) is that it enables us to assert a homonymy relation without specifying the term A—without saying in respect of *which*

¹ This is based on consideration of (a) all occurrences listed in Bonitz's *Index Aristotelicus*, and (b) all occurrences in the *Topics*; my impression is that this sample is fair. Similar things could be said of Aristotle's

use of συνώνυμος. It is not always easy to decide how to classify a given occurrence; and there are some occurrences which fit none of the classes very well.

term the objects in question are homonymous. But it is precisely this term which is the philosophically interesting feature of homonymy: that, say, Socrates and courage are homonymous is in itself of no consequence; what excites Aristotle is the claim that they are homonymous *with respect to the term 'being'*.¹

16. This leads to an obvious extension of (i), namely use (ii) which covers phrases of the form 'B₁, B₂, . . . , B_n are called A homonymously'. For examples see *Metaphysics Z* 10, 1035^b1; *Nicomachean Ethics E* 1, 1129^a30. An explanation for this use, (D12), can be produced from (D11) by changing 'homonymously' to 'called A homonymously' and deleting 'there is some term A such that'.

What happens if $n = 1$ —if there is only one B_i? This occurs in Aristotle and gives us use (iii), typified by sentences of the form (iii:a) 'B is called A homonymously' and (iii:b) 'B is A homonymously'. (Again Aristotle often says 'the B' rather than 'B'.) A common example of this concerns the status of dead organs: e.g. *De Generatione Animalium B* 1, 734^b25; *Meteorologica Δ* 12, 389^b31. Plainly, 'homonymously' in use (iii) amounts to much the same as 'in a derivative sense';² and so (iii) can be explained in terms of (ii) by:

(D13) B is (called) A homonymously if and only if there is a term C such that (i) B and C are A homonymously; and (ii) the sense of A in which a B is A is derivative from the sense in which a C is A.

Closely connected with (iii) is (iv): 'Some A is homonymous'; e.g. *Metaphysics Z* 10, 1035^b25; *De Interpretatione* 13, 23^a7. Clearly:

(D14) Some A is homonymous if and only if there is a term B such that B is A homonymously.

17. Class (v) has four subclasses: (v:a) 'The A's are homonymous'; (v:b) 'The A's are called homonymously'; (v:c) 'The A is homonymous'; (v:d) 'The A is called homonymously'. This is by far the largest of the five classes, uses of type (v:c) being particularly common; for examples see *Topics A* 15, 106^a21; *Z* 2, 139^b21; *Metaphysics Γ* 2, 1003^a34; *Eudemian Ethics H* 2, 1236^b25; 1236^a17. There is a close connection between (v) and that other standard formula of Aristotle's, 'A is called in many ways' (πολλὰ ὡς (πλεοναχῶς) λέγεται τὸ A).³

Use (v) is susceptible of the following definition:

(D15) The A(s) is/are (called) homonymous(ly) if and only if there are terms B₁, B₂, . . . , B_n (where $n \geq 2$) such that B₁, B₂, . . . , B_n are called A homonymously.

18. Uses (i)–(v) account, I think, for Aristotle's central⁴ uses of ὁμώνυμος;

¹ Why, then, is (i) Aristotle's 'official' sense? I suggest that it is just in his 'official' account of homonymy and synonymy that Aristotle is most indebted to Speusippus; when he comes to put the terms to use he rejects the Speusippian account as too cramping (cf. Merlan, 'Beiträge . . .'; H. J. Krämer, 'Zur geschichtlichen Stellung der aristotelischen Metaphysik', *Kant-Studien* lviii (1967), p. 341).

² In his notes on the second passage (*In Aristotelis Meteorologica Commentarius*, ed. M.

Hayduck, Berlin, 1899 (*CIAG* iii. 2), 223. 27) Alexander correctly contrasts ὁμωνύμως with κυρίως.

³ In the *Topics* at least this phrase is interchangeable with (v); in later works Aristotle sometimes distinguishes between homonymy and 'being said in many ways' (see, with circumspection, Hintikka's article above, p. 66 n. 1).

⁴ Quite distinct of course are the cases in which Aristotle uses ὁμώνυμος in its non-technical sense of 'having the same name as':

their definitions show their interconnections and their general debt to (i)—though they may do this in a somewhat too rigorous and schematic manner.

Is it plausible to suppose, with regard to any of uses (i)–(v), that homonymy ought regularly to be construed in a ‘Speusippian’ manner? This is a strange question, since the derivative uses of *ὁμώνυμος* have already been given ‘contextual’ definitions; that is, they have been explained by explaining as wholes certain typical formulae within which they occur. This being so, there is no room for the demand for a *separate* explanation of *ὁμώνυμος*, or for the question whether in these phrases it is predicated in a ‘Speusippian’ way.

However that may be, the only use which remotely invites a ‘Speusippian’ interpretation of homonymy is (v), specifically (v:c). Phrases of the form ‘the A’ are ambiguous in Greek when the noun substituted for A is neuter in gender; for ‘τὸ A’ means both ‘the A’ and ‘(the word) “A”’—e.g. τὸ στρατόπεδον means both ‘the camp’ and ‘(the word) “camp”’.¹ Hence it is possible to translate τὸ A ἐστὶν ὁμώνυμον as ‘“A” is homonymous’ where ‘homonymous’ is overtly predicated, in ‘Speusippian’ vein, of a linguistic item. But though grammar permits this translation, and though in some cases English appears to demand it,² I do not think that it is in general correct; for first, it does not apply equally to all cases of (v:c) but only to those in which ‘the A’ is neuter (but see below, n. 1); secondly, it does not apply to (v:a), (v:b), and (v:d) with which (v:c) is interchangeable; and thirdly, it is entirely otiose, since (D15) is adequate to explain the sense of (v:c).

Thus I do not think it is true in general of any of Aristotle’s standard uses of *ὁμώνυμος* that it encapsulates a ‘Speusippian’ occurrence of the adjective. It remains possible that the adjective *sometimes* occurs in ‘Speusippian’ guise, either because it is not used in accordance with any of (i)–(v), or because special contextual features make a ‘Speusippian’ interpretation of a standard occurrence obligatory or preferable. In the next few sections I shall look in turn at some of the occurrences of *ὁμώνυμος* and the like which might be taken to be ‘Speusippian’.

19. *Topics A* 15 contains ten occurrences of *ὁμώνυμος*, each of type (v:c), and two of *συνώνυμος*. Hambruch asserted that the latter denoted ‘Speusippian’

references in Bonitz’s *Index Aristotelicus*, 514^b13–18; cf. Alexander, *In Metaphysica* . . . , 51. 15; 77. 12 (Alexander says that Aristotle took this use over from Plato: cf. Anton, ‘The Aristotelian Doctrine . . .’, p. 318, with references).

¹ See in general Kühner–Gerth i, 586–97; and for Aristotle e.g. *Topics I* 32, 182^a18; 21; 30; *Metaphysics I* 4, 1006^a31; ^b2; 14; 17; 23; 26 (cf. Boethus (Simplicius, 25. 18–26); Porphyry, 61. 31–62. 6).

Thus Aristotle has the means of distinguishing between the ‘use’ and the ‘mention’ of an expression. But the situation is complicated by three factors: (a) sometimes the definite article takes the gender of the term it governs, even when the term is masculine or feminine and the article has its inverted-comma use: cf., e.g., *Categories*, 5, 3^b17; *Topics E* 2, 130^b3; *Z* 3, 141^a13; 4, 142^b5; *Poetics* 20, 1457^a28. (b) Aristotle subscribes

to the view that every term can be used autonomously—that A means both ‘A’ and ‘(the word) A’: cf. *Topics I* 14, 174^a8–9 (presumably the source of the medieval distinction between *formal* and *material* supposition: cf. E. A. Moody, *Truth and Consequence in Mediaeval Logic*, Amsterdam, 1953, pp. 23–5). (c) In practice, Aristotle sometimes at least ignores the ‘use’/‘mention’ distinction; a peculiarly discordant example is *Posterior Analytics A* 1, 71^a15–16.

² Viz. cases involving such curious but characteristically Aristotelian nominalizations as τὸ καθ’ ὃ (e.g. *Metaphysics Δ* 18, 1022^a14) and τὸ ἐκ τινος εἶναι (24, 1023^a26). But Aristotle uses nominalizations of this sort in contexts where the inverted-comma reading of the definite article is out of the question; see almost any occurrence of τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι or τὸ διὰ τί.

synonymy.¹ One occurrence of *συνώνυμος* is at 107^b17: ὡςθ' ὁμώνυμον τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ ὀξύ· τὸ γὰρ συνώνυμον πᾶν συμβλητόν. It is plain from what Aristotle says about 'comparability' elsewhere (*Physics H* 4, 248^a10–249^a29; cf. *Politics I* 12, 1283^a1–10) that the second sentence means: 'If X and Y are called A synonymously, then they are comparable with respect to A (i.e. they must be more, less, or equally A with one another).' There is no question of 'Speusippian' synonymy here. It is reasonable to infer that ὁμώνυμον in the previous sentence is likewise non-'Speusippian'. One other occurrence of ὁμώνυμος, at 107^a39, is shown by its context to be non-'Speusippian'. The other nine occurrences—one of *συνώνυμος* and eight of ὁμώνυμος—remain technically ambiguous. However, the fact that all twelve occurrences are of parallel grammatical form suggests the maxim that if any of the occurrences of -ώνυμος compounds in *A* 15 are 'Speusippian' then all are. From this maxim and the established Aristotelianism of three occurrences it follows that *A* 15 refers to no 'Speusippian' *onymies*.²

20. Cherniss (p. 57 n. 47) offers as an additional 'Speusippian' usage *De Partibus Animalium A* 3, 643^b7. The text runs: πάντα γὰρ ὡς εἶπεῖν ὅσα ἡμερα, καὶ ἄγρια τυγχάνει ὄντα, ὅλον ἄνθρωποι ἵπποι βόες κύνες [ἐν τῇ 'Ἰνδικῇ] ἕες αἰγες πρόβατα· ὧν ἕκαστον εἰ μὲν ὁμώνυμον, οὐ διήρηται χωρίς, . . . Clearly, the subject of <έστω> ὁμώνυμον is the same as the subject of διήρηται, namely ἕκαστον. But what is divided is each *genus*, not each *genus-name*. Hence what is homonymous is the *genus*, not the *genus-name*; and this is not 'Speusippian' homonymy.

21. Owen offers two passages in support of his contention that 'Aristotle's usage [sc. of ὁμώνυμος] is far from being as rigid as Hambruch supposes' (p. 104 n. 1); I take it that he thinks the two passages exhibit 'Speusippian' usage.

(i) *Posterior Analytics B* 17, 99^a7 and 12: εἰ μὲν ὁμώνυμα [sc. τὰ ἄκρα], ὁμώνυμον τὸ μέσον, εἰ δὲ ὡς ἐν γένει [sc. τὰ ἄκρα], ὁμοίως ἔξει [sc. τὸ μέσον]. . . . ὁμώνυμον γὰρ τὸ ὅμοιον ἐπὶ τούτων [sc. χρώματος καὶ σχήματος]. In the first sentence Aristotle is talking of the 'terms' of a syllogism, and it is natural to suppose him to be designating linguistic items; but it is likely that what is ὡς ἐν γένει is not the *words* substituted for the term-variables A, B, C, but the

¹ In this, as he says, he follows Waitz (ii. 452). Hambruch does not explicitly assert that the occurrences of ὁμώνυμος in *A* 15 are 'Speusippian', but I assume he thought they were: (a) he identifies 'Speusippian' ὁμώνυμα with πολλαχῶς λεγόμενα (p. 28 n. 1), and ὁμώνυμος is used synonymously with πολλαχῶς λεγόμενος in *A* 15; and (b) Waitz's argument that the *συνώνυμα* of *A* 15 are 'Speusippian' depends on his construing the ὁμώνυμα in the same context as 'Speusippian'. Waitz, however, is far from clear on this issue; in his notes on the *Categories* he says in general: 'definit [sc. Aristoteles] vocum et homonymiam et synonymiam, non rerum' (i. 272).

The translators implicitly side with Hambruch: see, e.g., Pickard-Cambridge's Oxford Translation, Forster's Loeb, Brunschwig's Budé.

² Hambruch (p. 29 n. 1; cf. L. Robin, *La Théorie platonicienne des idées et des nombres d'après Aristote*, Paris, 1908, p. 138) also suggests that the account of numerical identity in *Topics A* 7 is influenced by Speusippus: the first definition of 'one in number' (103^a9–10; 25–7) is, he claims, at once inconsistent with what Aristotle says elsewhere about numerical identity and identical with what Speusippus says about polyonymy. (Alexander, *In Aristotelis Topico-rum libros octo commentaria*, ed. M. Wallies, Berlin, 1891 (*CLAG* ii. 2), 58. 8–11 takes things numerically one to be polyonymous; cf. *In Metaphysica* . . . , 281. 24). If Hambruch is right, then Speusippus' polyonymy is not 'Speusippian'; for Aristotle's numerical identity is not a relation that holds only between linguistic items.

objects *denoted* by these words. And if that is so, then it is natural to suppose that these same objects are what are *δμώνυμα*.¹

The second sentence contains a standard (v:c) occurrence; there is no special reason for taking it in 'Speusippian' fashion.

(ii) *Physics H* 4, 248^b12-21: in *H* 4 as a whole the word *δμώνυμος* occurs seven times (*δμωνυμία* appears twice; *συνώνυμος*, probably, once). Three of these occurrences are shown by their context to be non-'Speusippian'; these are all of type (v:c). Three more of the seven examples are also of type (v:c), and I infer that they too are non-'Speusippian'. The remaining occurrence is at 248^b17: *ἀλλ' ἐνίων καὶ οἱ λόγοι δμώνυμοι* (cf. *Topics A* 15, 107^b6; *E* 2, 129^b31). This does not easily fall under any of uses (i)-(v); and it is readily, and no doubt rightly, taken in a 'Speusippian' sense.²

22. I have noticed a few other 'Speusippian' uses to add to the last one:

(i) *Topics I* 17, 175^a37, which refers to a 'non-homonymous contradiction'; (ii) compare with this *De Interpretatione* 6, 17^a35; (iii) *Rhetoric Γ* 2, 1404^b38: *τῶν δ' ὀνομάτων τῷ μὲν σοφιστῇ δμωνυμίαι χρησιμοί (παρὰ ταύτας γὰρ κακουργεῖ), τῷ ποιητῇ δὲ συνωνυμίαι*.³ Porphyry (61. 14) states that homonyms are things but homonymies are words, and he doubtless had this passage in mind. There are other places in Aristotle in which it is tempting to construe homonymies as words (e.g. *Rhetoric Γ* 11, 1412^b11; *Posterior Analytics A* 24, 85^b16; *B* 13, 97^b36); perhaps *δμωνυμία* has this sense in the phrases *λέγεσθαι (εἶναι) καθ' δμωνυμίαν* and *παρὰ τὴν δμωνυμίαν*. (iv) *Physics Γ* 7, 207^b9, mentions paronymous words; *Topics I* 5, 167^a24, uses the phrase *ὄνομα μὴ συνώνυμον*; *Topics E* 2, 129^b30 (cf. *De Generatione et Corruptione A* 6, 322^b30) talks of *ὀνόματα* being said in many ways.

This list does not pretend to be exhaustive; but I do not believe that genuine 'Speusippian' uses of *δμώνυμος* and the like are anything other than rare in Aristotle.

D. CONCLUSION

23. The Hambruch thesis states (a) that Speusippus' notion of homonymy and synonymy differ from Aristotle's, and in particular (b) that Speusippus' *onymies*, unlike Aristotle's, are properties specific to linguistic items; the thesis maintains further, (c), that in certain passages, notably in the first book of the *Topics*, Aristotle fell under Speusippus' influence and temporarily forsook his own notion of the *onymies*.

¹ W. D. Ross (*Aristotle's Prior and Posterior Analytics*, Oxford, 1949, p. 668) paraphrases: 'If the major is ambiguous, so is the middle. If the major is a generic property . . . , so is the middle term.' The reference of 'the major' and of 'the middle' shifts from the first to the second of these sentences. It may be that Aristotle is guilty of some such shift; but he need not be.

² We naturally suppose that a *λόγος* is a sentence, or at least some sort of concatenation of linguistic items; and so it often is. But of course Aristotle regularly takes the *λόγος* of a thing to be the same as its *οὐσία* or *εἶδος*; and these are certainly not linguistic entities.

³ Porphyry (Simplicius, 36. 27) commented that *συνωνυμία* here is used in an unusual sense, and he reports that it appeared in the *Poetics* too (= frag. III Kassel: the passage is not identical with the *Rhetoric* passage as Waitz i. 272, Lang, p. 66, and others suppose). Alexander detected further examples of this use of *συνώνυμος* in Aristotle: cf. *In Metaphysica* . . . , 280. 20 (cf. 32-5), on *Metaphysics Γ* 4, 1006^b14; *In Topica* . . . , 577. 18, on *Topics*, Θ 13, 162^b36 (but see F. A. Trendelenburg, *Elementa Logices Aristoteleae*⁶, Berlin, 1868, pp. 126-7).

Against this I have argued (*b'*) that on the whole our evidence suggests that Speusippus did not define his four *onymies* as specifically linguistic properties, and in general, (*a'*), that in all probability Speusippus' accounts of homonymy and synonymy differed only trivially from Aristotle's definitions at the beginning of the *Categories*.

Further, I have indicated that Aristotle's definitions in the *Categories* cannot be applied without more ado to more than a fraction of the occurrences of *δμῶνυμος* and *συνώνυμος* in his works, and that the words occur in a number of different but connected ways. I allow (*c'*) that in a few places homonymy and synonymy appear, uncharacteristically, as linguistic properties; this concedes something to part (*c*) of the Hambruch thesis, but of course it differs from (*c*) in that by virtue of (*b'*) these uncharacteristic passages cannot be supposed to betray the backstage influence of Speusippus.

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